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Abstract 
 
The subject of this essay is formed from three classic pieces of writing: The End of 
Laissez-Faire by John Maynard Keynes, The End of History? by Francis Fukuyama, and 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. All three essays were concerned 
with the evolution of ideas, with Keynes and Fukuyama additionally arguing for the 
centrality of ideas and consciousness in determining material outcomes and government 
policy. I wish to argue that neither Kuhn’s nor Fukuyama’s “revolutionary” account fits the 
bill for the path of change in the ideas of political economy. Rather, despite the title of his 
essay, the gradual and multilayered process described in Keynes’s account of the 
emergence and then questioning of laissez-faire is a better guide to the likely path of the 
evolution of this key doctrine of political economy in the coming decades.   
                                                 
* Cornell University, T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and 
Management, and Professor of Economics. Paper prepared for the “Keynes for Today” workshop, Ithaca, NY, 
March 20, 2015. 
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1. Introduction 
“The disposition towards public affairs, which we conveniently sum up as 
individualism and laissez-faire, drew its sustenance from many different rivulets of thought 
and springs of feeling. For more than a hundred years our philosophers ruled us because, by 
a miracle, they nearly all agreed or seemed to agree on this one thing……But a change is in 
the air.”1 
 
John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-Faire, 1926 
 
“And yet, all of these people sense dimly that there is some larger process at work, 
a process that gives coherence and order to the daily headlines….. [T]he century that began 
full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its 
close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a 
convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed 
victory of economic and political liberalism.”2 
 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History? 1989 
 
"Probably the single most prevalent claim advanced by the proponents of a new 
paradigm is that they can solve the problems that have led the old one to a crisis. ... 
Copernicus thus claimed that he had solved the long-vexing problem of the length of the 
calendar year, Newton that he had reconciled terrestrial and celestial mechanics, Lavoisier 
that he had solved the problems of gas-identity and of weight relations, and Einstein that he 
had make electrodynamics compatible with a revised science of motion." 
 
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962.3 
 
 The subject of my essay is formed from three pieces of writing: The End of Laissez-
Faire by John Maynard Keynes, The End of History? by Francis Fukuyama, and The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas Kuhn. All three essays were concerned with 
the evolution of ideas, with Keynes and Fukuyama additionally arguing for the centrality of 
ideas and consciousness in determining material outcomes and government policy. Indeed, 
in his essay Fukuyama approvingly refers to Keynes “when he said that the views of men 
of affairs were usually derived from defunct economists and academic scribblers of earlier 
generations.”4 I wish to argue here that neither Kuhn’s nor Fukuyama’s “revolutionary” 
account fits the bill for the path of change in the ideas of political economy. Rather, despite 
the title of his essay, the gradual and multilayered process described in Keynes’s account of 
the emergence and then questioning of laissez-faire is a better guide to the likely path of the 
evolution of political economy in the coming decades.  
 
                                                 
1 Keynes (1926, p. 272) 
2 Fukuyama (1989, p. 1) 
3 Kuhn (1962, p. 153) 
4 Fukuyama (1989, p. 3) 
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Keynes described the long path of the emergence of laissez-faire and predicted the 
beginning of its end in 1926. But in 1989 Fukuyama loudly proclaimed the victory of 
economic and political liberalism as “the end of history as such: that is, the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution…..”5 Fukuyama’s characterization is close to Kuhn’s 
scientific revolutions, which are "non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an 
older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one." Interestingly, 
Kuhn himself goes on make the link with the social when he says: "Like the choice 
between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a 
choice between incompatible modes of community life."6  
 
But does “paradigm shift” really capture the actual process of change in the ideas of 
political economy, with one big idea or another sweeping all that came before it? I follow 
Bronfenbrenner (1971) in his early critique of Kuhn in arguing that there are no equivalents 
of “Ptolemaic astronomy, phlogistonic chemistry, and humoral medicine” in political 
economy; “Economic paradigms, economic “normal science”, both display a certain 
tenacity Kuhn has not found in the natural sciences….”7 In this world view, “the end of 
history” in 1989 was unlikely, indeed impossible. Fukuyama himself can be argued to have 
retreated from his strong iconic position at the end of the cold war. In any event, as I noted 
in 2001, “The end of history lasted for such a short time.”8  In the present paper I argue that 
the framework provided by Keynes for an organic evolution of ideas in political economy 
is a better guide to what the ideological landscape will look like going ahead from 2026, 
the hundredth anniversary of the publication of The End of Laissez-Faire. 
 
My plan is as follows. Section 2 describes the bare bones of Fukuyama’s thesis and 
its roots in Hegelian idealism. I focus on the original essay of 1989 rather than later 
developments in long form in the 1990 book because I find it to be a sharper statement of 
the basic thesis. Section 3 links the paradigm shift announced by Fukuyama in the victory 
of economic liberalism to the Kuhnian thesis of a paradigm shift in ideas. I argue that such 
shifts are rare in political economy. In light of this, Section 4 turns to the more nuanced 
evolutionary account given by Keynes of the emergence of laissez-faire as an ideology, and 
his predictions on its future. Section 5 concludes by using his framework to speculate about 
the future of the laissez-faire doctrine in the coming decades. 
  
                                                 
5 Fukuyama (1989, p. 1) 
6 Kuhn (1962, p. 94) 
7 Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 2) 
8 Kanbur (2001, p. 1083).  I have developed the evolutionary perspective with respect to the markets versus 
state debates in Kanbur (2009); see also Devarajan and Kanbur (2014). 
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2. The End of History? 
 It is somewhat embarrassing to begin to give an account of Fukuyama’s thesis in his 
1989 essay. So much has been written about it and all of us have read about it in one form 
or another in countless popular pieces. The phrase itself has entered common parlance, 
albeit interpreted in many different ways. And it has been given an ongoing life because of 
its myriad critics, and the critics of these critics. What more is there to say other than that it 
proclaimed, in effect, absolute victory of a particular ideology at a particular point in time, 
and claimed that this victory was forever? 
 
 There is, in fact, much to be learnt from a close reading of Fukuyama’s original 
essay, not least about the depth of its Hegelian roots. As Fukuyama notes: 
 
“The notion of the end of history is not an original one. Its best known propagator 
was Karl Marx, who believed that the direction of historical development was a purposeful 
one determined by the interplay of material forces, and would come to an end only with the 
achievement of a communist utopia that would finally resolve all prior contradictions. But 
the concept of history as a dialectical process with a beginning, a middle, and an end was 
borrowed by Marx from his great German predecessor, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.”9 
But going beyond historicism, and Fukuyama in any case applauds attempts to “save Hegel 
from his Marxist interpreters”, for Fukuyama a key feature is that in Hegel “the 
contradictions that drive history exist first of all in the realm of human consciousness, i.e. 
on the level of ideas…[A]ll human behavior in the material world, and hence all human 
history, is rooted in a prior state of consciousness.” This is Hegelian “idealism” and the 
dominance of “ideology.” 
 
 As noted in the introduction, Fukuyama makes the link, approvingly, between this 
Hegelian precept and Keynes’s warnings on the influence of academic scribblers on 
economic policy. But he combines both Hegelian idealism and the Hegelian dialectical 
perspective to arrive at his characteristic pronouncement on the end of history and the 
triumph of the “liberal idea.” Indeed, the first step in the argument is that the primary 
victory is in the realm of ideas, not just in terms of material progress: 
 
“…[I]t is commonplace in the West to interpret the reform movements first in 
China and most recently in the Soviet Union as the victory of the material over the 
ideal…..But the deep defects of socialist economies were evident thirty or forty years ago 
to anyone who chose to look. Why was it that these countries moved away from central 
planning only in the 1980s? The answer must be found in the consciousness of the elites 
and leaders ruling them……That change was in no way made inevitable by the material 
conditions in which either country found itself on the eve of the reform, but instead came 
about as the result of the victory of one idea over another.”10 
 
 
                                                 
9 Fukuyama (1989, p. 1) 
10 Fukuyama (1989, p. 4) 
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After arguing for this as a victory of ideas, Fukuyama goes on to make his case for 
absolute victory and permanent victory. While much of the specifics of what Fukuyama 
writes now reads as very dated, the core of his argument is clearly visible, and involves an 
interplay between the ideological and the material. He is also aware that the end of history 
is too tidy a characterization for the messy reality of outcomes on the ground. While 
discussing the state of the Soviet Union and its demise he notes: “But at the end of history 
it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end 
their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.” 
 
However, the victory of liberalism over both fascism and over communism is 
evidence enough for Fukuyama that there are no further “fundamental ‘contradictions’ in 
human life that cannot be resolved in the context of modern liberalism,” and he dismisses 
both religious fundamentalism and nationalism as being serious threats. Of course it is 
precisely these factors, alongside the newly emerging economic and political contradictions 
of a globalized economy (for example Dani Rodrik’s (2007) famous trilemma, “democracy, 
national sovereignty and global economic integration are mutually incompatible: we can 
combine any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously and in full”), which 
have animated the debates on political economy in the last quarter century, some of it in the 
form of critiques of Fukuyama’s end of history thesis. Fukuyama himself appears to have 
moved away from his earlier stridency towards a more nuanced perspective on the 
evolution of political economy. But should he perhaps have started with such a perspective 
to begin with? 
 
 
3. Paradigm Shifts in Political Economy 
 Some of Fukuyama’s writing, especially on the absolute and permanent victory of 
one set of ideas over another, evokes a debate which took place in the social sciences after 
the appearance of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. Kuhn’s 
thesis, no less iconic than Fukuyama’s at the time, was that there are periodic scientific 
revolutions which sweep all before them. Examples of paradigms are those encapsulated in 
great works such as Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus or Newton’s Principia, which are 
"sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing 
modes of scientific activity."11 Kuhn describes the process of buildup of anomalies of 
evidence, for example in Ptolemaic astronomy, which eventually lead to a crisis of the 
dominant paradigm and thence a “paradigm shift”. This shift leads to the complete and 
absolute disappearance of old modes of thought and a reorientation towards the new 
framework.12 
 
 The appearance of Kuhn’s book had quite an impact on the intellectual history and 
on the study of the history of ideas, especially in the natural sciences which was Kuhn’s 
focus. But, perhaps not surprisingly, the question arose as to the possible application of 
Kuhn’s thesis to the social sciences in general, and to political economy and economics in 
particular. Coats (1969) was among the first to study this question for economics, and 
                                                 
11 Kuhn (1962, p. 10) 
12 Along with Kuhn’s book, I have also relied on an excellent summary and interpretation by Forster (1998). 
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concluded that although “the structure of scientific revolutions is much less readily 
discernible in economics than in the natural sciences,”13 nevertheless an application of 
Kuhn was possible, the leading candidate being of course the Keynesian revolution: 
 
“….the most striking example of paradigm-change in economics, the Keynesian 
revolution of the 1930’s, possessed many of the characteristics associated with Kuhn’s 
scientific revolutions. There were unrecognized precursors of Keynes, a growing concern 
about the inadequacy of existing theory, and a change of psychological outlook on the part 
of many economists virtually amounting to a ‘conversion experience’.” 14 
 
Although he classed these as less significant events, Coats (1969) also said that “earlier 
revolutions have occurred, each of which has exhibited points of similarity with Kuhn’s 
revolutions--much as the victory of classical economics via the Political Economy Club; 
the Methodenstreit between German and Austrian economists ; and the more purely 
cognitive marginal utility revolution.” 15 
 
 Doubts about the application of the “revolution” concept in political economy were 
raised very soon after the initial attempts at transference from the Kuhnian paradigm shift 
model. Blaug (1972) asked “Was there a Marginal Revolution?” and answered with great 
caution: “the ‘marginal revolution’ was a process, not an event.”16 But the major 
contribution in this area was that of Bronfenbrenner (1971) who concluded that: 
 
“….neither conventional incrementalism or “uniformitarianism” on the one hand, 
nor Thomas Kuhn's “catastrophic” theory of scientific revolution on the other, fits the 
broad sweep of economic doctrinal history particularly well, over its quarter-millennium of 
relative independence from ‘moral philosophy’. Furthermore, a crude Hegelian dialectic of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis may fit the principal facts of that history less badly than either of 
the two rivals I have mentioned.”17 
 
Before considering Bronfenbrenner’s argument in detail it is interesting to see the 
alternative use of the Hegelian dialectic compared to Fukuyama. For Fukuyama, the end of 
history resolves all fundamental contradictions once and for all—at least he argued that it 
did so for the case of the victory of economic and political liberalism. For Bronfenbrenner, 
the evolution of ideas is an ever ongoing process with established ones (the thesis) being 
challenged by new ones (the antithesis), leading to a synthesis which then awaits its own 
challenges—perhaps including from some of the discarded past ideas. 
 
 Bronfenbrenner offers three possible candidates for revolutions, Kuhnian paradigm 
shifts, in political economy “over its quarter-millennium of relative independence from 
‘moral philosophy’”: 
 
                                                 
13 Coats (1969, p. 293) 
14 Coats (1969, p. 293) 
15 Coats (1969, p. 294) 
16 Blaug (1972, p. 280) 
17 Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 1) 
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“The first is a laissez-faire revolution….. A conventional date is 1776, when Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations was published…..The second possible revolution is the breakup 
of the classical school which followed Smith, and which was led in turn by David Ricardo 
and John Stuart Mill. A conventional date for this second, or “utility”, revolution is 1870. 
The third possible revolution is the breakup of the neoclassical Cambridge School which 
arose from the utility revolution under the aegis of Alfred Marshall and his successor A. C. 
Pigou. This revolution occurred during the Great Depression. A conventional date is 1936, 
the appearance of J. M. Keynes's General Theory.”18 
 
Before proceeding with his analysis, Bronfenbrenner does note that  “None of these 
three revolutions would rank—for a noneconomist, at least—with the Copernican, 
Newtonian, and Darwinian revolutions in astronomy, physics, and biology, but they are the 
best economics has to offer.”19 But Bronfenbrenner goes further and argues that each of 
these three candidates were less like Kuhnian paradigm shifts and more like syntheses 
between earlier theses and their antitheses. The famous “Marshallian scissors” bringing 
together classical supply side and the demand side from utility diminishes the claim of the 
utility revolution to in fact be a revolution. On this interpretation the “Keynesian 
revolution” was also not a revolution but an antithesis to the ruling thesis which then led in 
the post-war period to the Hicks-Samuelson synthesis, represented now by the intersection 
between the IS and LM curves.  
 
Why, then, the difficulty in establishing convincingly the presence of revolutions 
and paradigm shifts in the history of political economic thought? Bronfenbrenner offers 
two suggestions. First, “outmoded” ideas tend to live on in political economy—the 
persistence of mercantilist ideas despite their periodic drubbing is given as an example. 
Secondly and relatedly, “important advances tend to be major accretions without any 
corresponding rejections of existing paradigms. Utility theories of value did not displace 
cost theories….Marxian economics has not, after all, displaced bourgeois economics in any 
country which preserves a free market in ideas….It is even difficult to think of an 
important tenet of pre-Keynesian economics that Keynes displaced permanently…..;yet no 
one denies the importance of the General Theory.”20 
 
Thus Kuhn’s revolutions and paradigm shifts, and Fukuyama’s end of history 
finality, seem to be inappropriate and unsuited to the evolution of ideas in political 
economy, and this includes the Keynesian revolution. In fact, Keynes had given a brilliant 
account of the evolution of the laissez faire doctrine which I would argue, despite the title 
of Keynes’s essay, makes clear why we would not see the absolute end of the laissez-faire 
doctrine--why it was likely to survive in a mix of competing ideas in the years to come, and 
even win victories which would allow Fukuyama to use it as one component of his end of 
history doctrine. 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 2) 
19 Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 3) 
20 Bronfenbrenner (1971, p. 11) 
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4. The End of Laissez-Faire, 1926 
 Keynes’s essay is a beautifully written account of the “many different rivulets of 
thought and springs of feeling” which fed into the development of the laissez-faire 
doctrine. The dominance of this doctrine in the 19th century is highlighted by Keynes with 
the example of an extract from an 1850 pamphlet Easy Lessons for the Use of Young 
People, by Archbishop Whately, distributed by the Society for Promoting Christian 
Knowledge: “More harm than good is likely to be done by almost any interference of 
Government with menʹs money transactions, whether letting and leasing, or buying and 
selling of any kind.ʹ True liberty is ʹthat every man should be left free to dispose of his own 
property, his own time, and strength, and skill, in whatever way he himself may think fit, 
provided he does no wrong to his neighbours”.21 This is of course a very English version of 
the famous late 17th century exchange between Colbert and the merchant Legendre: “Que 
faut-il faire pour vous aider?---Nous laisser faire.” But in England by the mid 19th century, 
according to Keynes’s acerbic commentary, “the dogma had got hold of the educational 
machine; it had become a copybook maxim. The political philosophy, which the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had forged in order to throw down kings and prelates, 
had been made milk for babes, and had literally entered the nursery.”22 
 
 How this happened, indeed how laissez-faire was “forged in order to throw down 
kings and prelates,” and the role economists played in this evolution, constitutes the 
fascinating first part of Keynes’s essay. The route to challenging kings and prelates was 
through individualism of Locke and Hume: 
 
“The purpose of promoting the individual was to depose the monarch and the 
church; the effect through the new ethical significance attributed to contract was to buttress 
property and prescriptions. But it was not long before the claims of society raised 
themselves anew against the individual. Paley and Bentham accepted utilitarian hedonism 
from the hands of Hume and his predecessors, but enlarged it into social utility…. 
Rousseau took the Social Contract from Locke and drew out of it the General Will. Paley 
and Bentham reached the same destination, but by different routes. Paley avoided an 
egoistic conclusion to his hedonism by a God from the machine…Bentham reached the 
same result by pure reason. There is no rational ground, he argued, for preferring the 
happiness of one individual, even oneself, to that of any other. Hence the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number is the sole rational object of conduct taking…Rousseau derived 
equality from the state of nature, Paley from the will of God, Bentham from a mathematical 
law of indifference. Equality and altruism had thus entered political philosophy, and from 
Rousseau and Bentham sprang both democracy and utilitarian socialism.”23 
 
However, Keynes argued, the task could not have been completed without 
economists, “who sprang into prominence just at the right moment.”24 This was the idea 
that individual pursuing their own interest would advance the general interest: “The 
                                                 
21 Keynes (1926, p. 280) 
22 Keynes (1926, p. 280) 
23 Keynes (1926, p. 273) 
24 Keynes (1926, p. 274) 
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principle of laissez-faire had arrived to harmonise individualism and socialism, and to 
make at one Humeʹs egoism with the greatest good of the greatest number.”25 While Adam 
Smith is the best known to current generations as the proponent of this position, Keynes 
produces a long list of economists and men of affairs who were equally important at the 
time in developing and pushing the idea. Further, the advent of Darwin led to a further 
strand and strengthening of the argument: 
 
“The economists were teaching that wealth, commerce, and machinery were the 
children of free competition--that free competition built London. But the Darwinians could 
go one better than that --free competition had built man. The human eye was no longer the 
demonstration of design, miraculously contriving all things for the best; it was the supreme 
achievement of chance, operating under conditions of free competition and laissez-faire.”26 
 
But, of course, the economists’ teachings, which were so important in bolstering the 
move to individualism, were based on assumptions that were not necessarily valid: 
 
“Let us clear from the ground the metaphysical or general principles upon which, 
from time to time, laissez-faire has been founded. It is not true that individuals possess a 
prescriptive ʹnatural libertyʹ in their economic activities. There is no ʹcompactʹ conferring 
perpetual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire. The world is not so governed 
from above that private and social interest always coincide. It is not so managed here below 
that in practice they coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics 
that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-
interest generally is enlightened; more often individuals acting separately to promote their 
own ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. Experience does not show that 
individuals, when they make up a social unit, are always less clear sighted than when they 
act separately.”27 
 
So we come to a point in the evolution of ideas where, having passed through a 
number of stages—individualism to challenge monarch and church; the social challenge to 
this individualism; the entry of economists with a theory and a set of assumptions which 
aligned private and general interest; and these assumptions not being ones “nearest to the 
facts”—Keynes now poses a fundamental issue in political economy: 
 
“We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its merits in 
detail what Burke termed ʹone of the finest problems in legislation, namely, to determine 
what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to 
leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.ʹ” 28 
 
Indeed, Keynes further specifies the problem as follows, using terms from Bentham: 
“Perhaps the chief task of economists at this hour is to distinguish afresh the Agenda of 
                                                 
25 Keynes (1926, p. 275). 
26 Keynes (1926, p. 276). 
27 Keynes (1926, pp. 287-288). 
28 Keynes (1926, p. 288). 
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government from the Non Agenda.”29 And his famous and well known statement follows 
from this: “The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are 
doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at 
present are not done at all.”30 Keynes then goes on to identify three problems which he 
thinks are on the Agenda list: (i) addressing the consequences of risk, uncertainty and 
ignorance; (ii) coordination of saving and investment; and (iii) population policy. And he 
clearly sees government action on these Agenda items as being contrary to the laissez-faire 
doctrine. 
 
 
5. Laissez-Faire in 2026 
 Keynes’s announcement of the end of laissez-faire in 1926 seems an altogether 
more muted affair than Fukuyama’s declaration of the victory of economic liberalism in 
1989 at the end of the cold war. Keynes’s account of the emergence of laissez-faire through 
the sparks of individualism in the seventeenth century, its battles with social perspectives 
of Rousseau, Paley and Bentham, its eventual dominance in the nineteenth century helped 
along by economics and economists, and its eventual questioning including by Keynes 
himself in the essay, seems to have more in common with Bronfenbrenner’s account of the 
evolution of ideas in political economy as a Hegelian dialectic between thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis, than it does with Kuhn’s sharp and permanent paradigm shifts, in which the 
Fukuyama of the end of history would be a kindred spirit. 
 
 Equally, Keynes’s account of the central issue of political economy as being to 
“distinguish afresh the Agenda of government from the Non Agenda” also supports 
Bronfenbrenner’s reasoning on why sharp paradigm shifts in the Kuhnian sense are not 
seen in the ideas of political economy. Bronfenbrenner’s reasoning was that in political 
economy, ideas are not displaced permanently, and ideas which were once outmoded 
reappear. This is perhaps not surprising if the charge to political economy is, as Burke said, 
“to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and 
what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to individual exertion.” It is 
this question which is eternal, and it will have to be answered afresh by every generation of 
political economists. The balance may move this way and that, depending on the material 
circumstances and, yes, the ideological map. Laissez-faire did emerge as a challenge to 
monarchy and church, was challenged, became dominant, was questioned again and, if 
Fukuyama was to be believed in 1989, triumphed unequivocally.  
 
But the Fukuyama triumph of laissez-faire was short lived as new problems arose 
and the balance between state and individual had to be recalibrated for the new realities of 
a globalized world. Indeed, reading both Keynes and Fukuyama it is striking how 
“Westphalian” their perspectives are on the state. The theatre in which “the government is 
not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little 
worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all,” is that of the 
Westphalian nation state. But this conception of the nation state itself has come under 
                                                 
29 Keynes (1926, p. 288). 
30 Keynes (1926, p. 291) 
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strain, both in terms of sub-national and supra-national pressures. The Keynes of 1926 
shows himself to be aware of the sub-national when he writes: “I believe that in many cases 
the ideal size for the unit of control and organisation lies somewhere between the 
individual and the modern State. I suggest, therefore, that progress lies in the growth and 
the recognition of semiautonomous bodies within the State.” But this Keynes is not yet the 
Keynes of the 1940s, the Keynes of the Clearing Union and Bretton Woods, battling to 
design a system of coordination between nation states facing supra-national interactions 
and problems. He would, however, have felt further vindicated in questioning the doctrine 
of laissez-faire in the international arena. 
 
So, what might an essay entitled The End of Laissez-Faire look like if it were to be 
written in 2026, a hundred years after Keynes first penned the title? Surely we would cover 
the history of thought of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and it is 
doubtful if we could do a better job than Keynes did. We would have the last three quarters 
of the twentieth century and the first quarter of the twenty first to cover in addition. We 
would no doubt highlight the remarkable expansion of state regulation and state 
expenditure especially after the Second World War, and the countries where the state 
owned all means of production.  
 
We would then of course discuss the end of the cold war and Fukuyama’s 
declaration of the victory of laissez-faire as an idea, followed rapidly by the global 
financial crises of the 1990s and the 2000s, and rising inequalities, in parallel with 
unprecedented growth and prosperity in previously poor countries. These problems at the 
end of the first quarter of the twenty first century would have called into question the 
laissez-faire a' l’outrance of the supposed end of history at the end of the twentieth century. 
But wasn’t this the same laissez-faire which Keynes called into question at the end of the 
first quarter of the twentieth century? Surely yes, but now broadened into the global arena, 
with global and cross-border issues to the fore. And might there not be yet more 
declarations of the victory of laissez-faire as the pendulum shifts back and forth again, as it 
has done ever since it emerged as a doctrine to “throw down kings and prelates”? Again, 
surely yes. Keynes’s masterful account of the history of the doctrine, the history of the 
following century, and the fundamental problematic of political economy as the balance 
between state and individual, will all ensure that the end of laissez-faire will be pronounced 
periodically but, whenever it is pronounced, the end will only last for a short time. 
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